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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST C'O., 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
v. 
CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and 
WINFORD BUNCE1 
Defendants and Appellants 
APPELLANTS' BRIE·F 
Civil No. 9138 
The above named appellants, defendants in the Dis-
trict Court, appeal from the judgment entered in this 
cause by that court pursuant to respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ·FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent commenced an action in the Dis-
trict Court to obtain a judgment against the defendants-
appellants on a Promissory Note executed by the defend-
ants in favor of the plaintiff. 
Defendants, by their answer, admitted the execution 
of the Note and a mortgage to secure payment of same, 
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liability for the unpaid balance of said note and as an af-
firmative defense alleged that a tender of full payment 
had been made on January 31, 1958 to the plaintiff and 
denied plaintiff's right to recover for attorney's fees, 
court costs and interest incurred after January 31, 1958. 
Defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiff al-
leging the execution and d~livery of the Note and Mort-
gage to the plaintiff, tender after maturity to the plain-
tiff of the full unpaid balance of said note, plaintiff's refusal 
to accept said tender and release the mortgage, that said 
refusal was because of a conspiracy with one Hal Han-
cock to deprive defendants of their equity in the mort-
gaged premises, and that said refusal to accept payment 
and release the mortgage prevented the defendants from 
redeeming the mortgaged property from a sheriff's sale on 
a first mortgage foreclosure and caused the defendants to 
be damaged by the loss of their equity in the mortgaged 
property. 
Plaintiff's reply admitted the execution of an assign-
ment of said note and mortgage to the said Hal Hancock 
and denied that said assignment was part of a conspiracy 
to enable Hancock to deprive the defendants of their 
equity in the mortgaged premises and denies that a tender 
of the amount due was made by the defendants to the 
plaintiff on January 31, 1958. 
Depositions of R. M. Worsley, agent for plaintiff cor-
poration, and defendants were taken. Requests for Ad-
mission and Answers thereto and the Affidavit of R. M. 
Worsley were filed and constitute part of the Record on 
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Appeal. A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by 
plaintiff on August 6, 1959 and a Hearing on said Motion 
was held in the District Court on August 19, 1959. Coun-
sel argued the Motion however there was no testimony or 
evidence introduced. After hearing the arguments of 
counsel and defense having stated that the counterclaim 
contained the facts which constituted defendants' claim 
the Court granted plaintiff's motion and dismissed defend-
ants' counterclaim. From that judgment of dismissal the 
defendants have brought this appeal. 
STATEMENT O·F POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE RECORD BE.FORE THE COURT 
SHOWS A MATERIAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE 
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT AND THAT 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANTS COUN-
TER CLAIM, IF PROVED, WOULD ENTITLE 
APPELLANTS TO RECOVER FOR DAMAGES. 
POIN'T II 
THAT WHERE THERE IS ANY GENUINE 
ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT, A MO-




THAT THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT 
SHOWS A MATERIAL ISSUE BETWEE.N THE 
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APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT. AND THAT 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANTS C·OUN-
TE·R CLAIM, IF P'ROVED, WOULD ENTITLE 
APPELLANTS TO RECOVER F'OR DAMAGES~ 
The record shows: (a) That on January 31, 1958 
plaintiff was the owner and holder of the promissory note 
and mortgage of defendants. (Defendant's Counterclaim-
paragraphs 5, 14,: 15, 18. and 19; plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint - paragraphs 1 and 2 and copy of Note at:-: 
tached; Deposition of· Robert M. Worsley-page 4, line 9; 
page 15, lines 13 through 30 and page 16, lines 1 through 
12, lines 18 through 30; page 27, line 23 through page 28 
and to page 29, line 5, page 30, line 13 through 25). Plain-
tiff denies that it was the owner and holder of the prom-
issory note and mortgage on January 31, 1958. (See Af-
fidavit of R. M. Worsley.) 
(b) That the defendants offered and attempted to 
pay said note and obtain a release of the mortgage on Jan-
uary 31, 1958. (See Defendants Counterclaim, paragraph 
18; Deposition of Robert. M. Worsley-page 19, line 13 
through 17; page 29, line 13 throug:Q. 15; page 21, line 24 
through 30.) Plaintiff denies defendants' tender. (See 
Plaintiff's Reply, paragraph 18.) 
(c) That plaintiff refused to allow defendants to pay 
the note and obtain a release of said mortgage. (Defend-
ants' Counterclaim, paragraph 19; Deposition of Robert M. 
Worsley, page 16, line 18 through·30.) 
(d) That plaintiff knew: defendants would lose a 
substantial sum of money if they (defendants) were not 
allowed to redeem the property from the foreclosure sale 
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and that payment to plaintiff was prerequisite to the right 
to redeem from the foreclosure sale. (Defendants' Counter-
claim, paragraphs 17 and 18; Deposition of Robert M. 
Worsley, page 21, line 34 throrugh 30.) This is denied by 
plaintiff. (See Plaintiff's Reply, paragraph 18.) 
(e) That the refusal of plaintiff to allow defend-
ants to pay the note and obtain a release of said mortgage 
caused dalmages to the defendants. (Defendants' Counter-
claim, paragraph 20; Deposition of Winford Bunce, page 
43, line 11 through 23.) 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Record 
shows a material issue to exist between plaintiff and de-
fendants. 
That defendants would be entitled to recover for dam-
ages if the allegations of the Counterclaim were proved 
the Court's attention is directed to Title 57-3-8 U.C.A. 
1953 which read as follows: 
"If the mortgagee fails to discharge or re-
lease any mortgage after the same has been fully 
satisfied, he shall be liable to the mortgagor for 
double the damages resulting from such failure. 
Or the mortgagor may bring an action against the 
mortgagee to compel the discharge or release of 
the mortgage after the same has been satisfied; and 
the judgment of the court must be that the mort-
gagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay 
the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages 
resulting from such failure." 
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Co., a Utah case, 105 
P2d342, the Court stated: 
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"The holder of a mortgage renders hi_mself 
liable to statutory penalty for refusing to release 
mortgage upon sufficient tender, although holder 
claims that tender is insufficient.'' 
Also see Nalder v. Kellogg, 4 U2d 117, 288 P2d 456; 
Shibata v. Bear River State Bank (Utah case) 205 P2d 
251. 
Corpus Juris Secundum on Mortgages, commencing 
at page 745 states: 
''Damages are recoverable for a wrongful re-
fusal to release or satisfy a mortgage after pay-
ment; and in many jurisdictions a remedy is pro-
vided by statutory provision which, being gener-
ally regarded as penal, are strictly construed. 
"While it has been said that there is no right 
of action at common law for damages for failure 
to satisfy a mortgage, independently of statute a 
right of action exists for damages for refusal, after 
payment, to reconvey property deeded as security 
or to release or discharge a mortgage. * * * 
Page 746: A right of action exists when the 
debt secured has been paid in full or tendered or 
all other legal conditions have been fulfilled, and 
plaintiff is entitled to the release or satisfaction 
demanded and refused. 
"In order to 1nake out a right of action, it is 
necessary to show that plaintiff is entitled to the 
release or satisfaction demanded and that the debt 
secured by the mortgage has been paid in full, or 
that the whole amount justly due has been ten-
dered, including any fees and costs accrued and 
the statu tory allowance, * * * 
Page 749: The complaint or petition should 
state all the facts necessary to establish plaintiff's 
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right to recovery. It should show plaintiff's title to 
maintain the action, and should describe the mort-
gage and show the relation of the parties to be 
that of mortgagor and mortgagee, and should aver 
distinctly the payment of the debt secured or other 
full performance of the conditions of the mortgage, 
and the demand for entry of satisfaction and re-
fusal thereof, and that the expenses of filing and 
recording such release were paid or tendered to 
the holder of the mortgage. * * * 
Defendants alleged in their counterclaim that plain-
tiff, on January 8, 1958, entered into a fraudulent and 
corrupt conspiracy and agreement with one Hal Hancock 
and executed a purported assignment of said promissory 
note and mortgage (par. 14); that no delivery of the note 
was made and that there was no consideration to support 
said assignment (par. 15) and that said purported assign-
ment was made to enable the said Hancock to attempt to 
redeem the mortgaged property in his (Hancock's.) name 
and deprive the defendants of their equity in said property 
(par. 16). 
The Affidavit of Robert M. Worsley, filed by the 
plaintiff states: 
AFFIDAVIT 
"Robert M. Worsley being first duly sworn 
deposes and says: 
1. That he is an employee of the Continental 
Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff herein, and is 
personally familiar with the transactions which are 
the subject of this action. 
2. That on February 3, 1956, defendants ex-
ecuted and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note, 
a copy of which is attached to plaintiff's complaint. 
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3. That on June 10, 1957, defendants exe-
cuted .a mortgage to secure said promissory note, 
which note was then in default, and said mortgage 
was delivered to affiant. 
4. T·hat on April 30, · 1957, First Security 
Bank commenced an action to foreclose the mort-
gage on the same property, which mortgage was 
prior to the mortgage of Continental, and on July 
8, 1957, property securing said mortgage was sold 
at foreclosure sale by the sheriff of Grand County, 
and was purchased by Flrst Security Bank, subject 
to the right to redeem witJ;lin six months from 
that date. 
5. That on January 8, 1958, the last day for 
redemption of the property as provided by law, 
C'ontinental was approached by one Hal Hancock 
and did assign its interest in the promissory note 
and mortgage which it held on said property under 
the terms and conditions reflected in the assign-. 
ment and letter executed by Hancock and Contin-
ental, copies of which are attached to this affidavit 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
·6. That on January 31, 1958, the assignment 
to Hancock was still in effect. 
7. That said mortgage and promissory note 
were not reassigned to Continental by Hancock 
until about September 2, 1958. 
Dated this 6th day of August, 195·9. 
S/ROBERT M. WORSLEY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th 
day of August, 1959. 
S/RUTH ATKINSON 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake- City, Utah 
My commission expires: 9-1-59" 
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'fo 
A copy of the Assignment is attached D! the Affidavit 
and is here set forth in full: 
"ASSIGNMENT OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, 
That the Continental Bank and Trust Company, a 
Utah state banking corporation with its principal 
place of business at Salt Lake City, Utah, the party 
of the first part, for and in consideration of the 
sum of Twenty One Hundred Thirty Three and 
47/lOO******Dollars ($2133.47) to it in hand paid 
by Hal Hancock the party of the second part, the 
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by 
these presents, grant, bargain, sell, assign, trans-
fer and set over unto the said party of the second 
part, a certain mortgage, bearing date of June lOth 
1957, made and executed by Charles Cunningham 
& Wilford Bunce, Mortgagors, to the party of the 
first part, mortgagee, and recorded on June lOth 
1957, in Book 7-K of Mortgages, at page 42-43, in 
the office of the county recorder of the County of 
Grand, State of Utah. 
TOGETHE.R with the indebtedness and prom-
issory note therein described, and the money due 
and to become thereon, with interest as provided 
in said note and mortgage. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said party of 
the first part has caused these presents to be ex-
ecuted by its officer thereunto lawfully authorized 
and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed this 
8th day of January, 1958. 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY 
By S/ GLEN STEF'FENSON, 
Assistant Vice President 
(Acknowledgment) 
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A copy of the Letter agreement referred to in the 
Affidavit is attached to the Affidavit and is here set forth 
in full: 
The Continental Bank & Trust Company 
P. 0. Box 1770 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I propose to redeem the following described 
property located at Moab, Grand County, Utah, 
upon which the Continental Bank & Trust Com-
pany owns a second mortgage. To wit: 
Beginning at Northwest corner Blk 25 run-
ing thence South 131 feet; East 171 feet, 
North 131 feet; West 171 feet to beginning. 
I will execute to the Continental Bank & Trust 
C;ompany a note which shall be due and payable 
on or before the 20th day of January in the amount 
of $2133.47. In return for said note, The Contin-
ental Bank will assign to me that certain mortgage 
dated on June 10, 1957, wherein Charles Cunning-
ham and Winford Bunce appear as mortgagors and 
the c:ontinental Bank & Trust Company appears 
as Mortgagee, which mortgage was recorded on 
June 10, 1957, Entry No. 282514, Book 7-K, pages 
42-43, in the office of the County Recorder, Grand 
Oounty, Utah. With this assignment of the real 
estate above referred to, I propose to redeem the 
property above described from the sheriff's sale 
held pursuant to the action brought by the First 
Security Bank, and in the event I am unable to 
redeem the property, then I will assign the real 
estate mortgage above referred back to the Contin-
ntal Bank & Trust C'Ompany, and in exchange, it 
is my understanding that the Bank will return the 
promissory note executed on January 8, 1958 by 
me in favor of the Continental Bank in the amount 
of $2133.47. 
(S) Hal Hancock" 
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Appellants contend that respondent was the owner 
and holder of the note and mortgage on January 31, 1958, 
supported by the record as follows: (a) The retention at 
all times of the promissory note by the respondent. Rob-
ert M. Worsley testified commencing on page 4, line 6 
(Deposition of Robert M. Worsley) as follows: 
Q. Did you deliver this assignment and the 
promissory note and mortgage to Mr. Hancock at 
that time? 
A. No. The mortgage was delivered to him 
with a photostat of the note. We retained the orig-
inal note. We had a side written guarantee. I don't 
mean guarantee, but agreement covering that. 
Q. Explain that to us, will you? 
A. Yes, the original note was available when 
and if our other agreement was breached. 
Q. What other agreement was that? 
A. Well, it is contained in the agreement bas-
ically that if they were able to redeem the prop-
erty-" 
Title 44-1-31 U.C.A. 1953 provides 
"An instrument is negotiated when it is trans-
ferred from one person to another in such manner 
as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. 
If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery; 
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorse-
ment of the holder completed by delivery." 
(bj) 1.(he purported assignment of the Note and 
mortgage was totally lacking in consideration and by the 
terms of the side agreement (letter) executed by Hancock 
and the respondent said assignment, even if valid, was 
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inffectual on January 31, 1958. The above referred to 
Letter (side written guarantee) provides that the consid-
eration for the assignment was a conditional promise to 
pay $2133.47 which condition was that Hancock would 
be able to redeem the property prior to January 20, 1958. 
There was no redemption of the property prior to January 
20, 1958, and hence no obligation to pay Continental and 
therefor consideration to support the assignment was 
totally lacking. 
By the terms of the Letter agreement between re-
spondent and Hancock, assuming for the purpose of argu-
ment that the Assignment and Letter agreement were 
valid transactions, on January 31, 1958 Hancock didn't 
owe the respondent any money because there had been 
no redemption and was only obligated to return the un-
rcorded Assignment of Mortgage. Continental (respond-
ent) held the original note and the only persons to whom 
it could look for payment were the appellants. 
POINT II 
THAT WHERE THERE IS ANY GENUINE 
ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT, A MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
In Young v. Felorina, 121 U. 646, 244 P. 2d 862 the 
court stated: 
"If there is any genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact, the motion should be denied." 
In United States v. General Instrument Corp. (1949, 
DC NJ) 87 F Supp 157, the court stated: 
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"that on motions for summary judgment, it is 
not for the court to resolve disputed questions 
which appear in issue but to determine whether a 
question of fact is present; however, the facts being 
determined, a court is not precluded from adjudi-
cating the legal consequences to be drawn from 
undisputed facts." 
In Morlan v. Durland Trust Co. (1952) 127 Colo 5, 252 
P2d 98 the court pointed out that: 
"summary judgment is properly granted only 
where the facts are clear and undisputed, and 
quoted with approval. from a federal district court 
decision (Michel v. Meier [1948, DC Pa] 8 FRD 
464) that "in passing upon a· motion for ·summary 
judgment, it is no part of the court's function to 
decide issues of fact but solely to determine wheth-
er there is an issue of fact to be tried.'' 
Attention is directed to King v. Rubinsky (1951, Tex 
Civ App) 241 SW2d 220, where the court stated: 
"On hearing the motion for summary judg-
ment the court's prerogative is to determine, if 
possible, whether there is a genuine controversy 
between the litigants. If it is clear there is none, 
then it is his duty to grant the motion. If the mat-
, ter is reasonably doubtful the motion would ·be re-
fused. The court should not decide the controverted 
issues in the case. These should be submitted to 
the court or jury upon trial of the case upon its 
merits. If this was not the rule a party could 
easily be deprived of his constitutional right to a 
t.rial by jury. * * * We find no fault with the rule 
and believe it is a just one for its intended purpose. 
However, we feel that proceedings under it should 
be had with a great deal of caution and in no event 
should a summary judgment be granted unless 
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it is made to appear with reasonable certainty 
that there is no genuine issue in the case. Other-
wise it would become the means of depriving a 
litigant of valuable substantive rights." 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, togeth-
er with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The record discloses various substantial controverted 
issues between plaintiff and defendants and therefor the 
lower courts dismissal of defendant's Counterclaim on 
plaintiff's motion for Bummary judgment was error. 
CONCLUSION 
At the hearing on respondent's motion for summary 
judgment no evidence or testimony was presented, how-
ever arguments of counsel were heard. As there is no 
transcript nor findings of fact by the court it is difficult 
for appellant's counsel to know the basis for the court's 
dismissal of appellants' counterclaim. The Affidavit of 
Robert M. Worsley is controverted by the allegations of 
defendants' counterclaim, the Letter attached to and made 
a part of said Affidavit, and Mr. Worsley's deposition as 
pointed out above. The allegations of defendants' counter-
claim were materially controverted by respondent's Reply, 
Mr. Worsley's deposition and Mr. Worsley's Affidavit. 
Did the appellants owe the respondent a sum of money 
on January 31, 1958? Respondent says, No," and appel-
lants say, "Yes." 
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Was respondent's assignment on January 8, 1958 
valid and still in effect on January 31, 1958 or was it fic-
titious and entered into for the purpose of enabling one 
Hancock to redeem the mortgaged property in his own 
name and deprive the appellants of their equity in said 
property? Respondent states the Assignment was valid 
and still effective on January 31, 1958. Appellants con-
tend the record shows the assignment not effective or in 
force on January 31, 1958, that it was executed without 
any consideration, that its execution had no effect what-
ever on the owneTship of the Note and was executed for 
the purpose of enabling Hancock to redeem the property 
in his own name and deprive the appellants of their equity 
in the property. 
Appellants believe substantial issues are shown by 
the record to exist and unless said issues can be present-
ed to the court or jury appellants will be deprived of val-
uable substantive rights. 
The trial court's judgment dismissing appellants' 
counterclaim should be reversed and the case remanded 
for trial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
HARRY E,. SNOW, 
MAXWELL BENTLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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